12. Your Right against Self-Incrimination. **
1. The Promise Against Self-Incrimination: In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
2. At First, This Did Not Apply To State Prosecutions: In 1908, the Supreme Court declined to extend this promise to state prosecutions. Two men accused of fraud refused to take the witness stand. The jury was told of this refusal and convicted them. This precedent was reversed in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan, when the Supreme Court extended the protection to state prosecutions.
Twining v. New Jersey, 1908.
3. Prosecutors And Judges Cannot Mention Defendants' Silence Or Imply Guilt: Hudson was convicted of kidnapping raping, and murdering a woman. He declined to take the stand. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that neither prosecutors nor judges could mention to a jury a defendant's refusal to testify nor imply that this refusal could be construed to imply guilt.
Griffin v. California, 1965.
4. The Rights To Be Informed Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To An Attorney: The Supreme Court held that both incriminating and exculpatory statements by suspects in custody could not be admitted against defendants at trial unless the suspects were first advised of their rights against self-incrimination and their rights to an attorney before and during interrogation, unless a suspect waived those rights. The "Miranda" warning provides: "You have the right to remain silent. If you choose not to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you by the court. Do you understand? Will you agree to speak with us without an attorney?"
Miranda v. Arizona, 1966.
5. Defendants May Be Required To Describe Their Alibi Witnesses Before Trial: The Supreme Court upheld a Florida law which required defendants to describe the expected testimony of proposed alibi witnesses before trial so that prosecutors could seek rebuttal evidence. The Supreme Court held that this would not unreasonably curtail a defendant's right against self-incrimination because a prosecutor could already interrupt a trial to seek rebuttal evidence after an alibi witness testified.
Williams v. Florida, 1970.
6. The State Cannot Require A Defendant To Either Be The First Defense Witness Or To Thereafter Waive His Right To Testify: The Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee law which required a criminal defendat to either be the first defense witness or to waive the right to testify after other witnesses had offered defense evidence. This law would have deprived any defendant of the right to determine if they needed to testify later in a trial, and would have denied defendants of their right to a lawyer's guidance in structirong and presenting their defenses.
Brooks v. Tennessee, 1972.
7. A Judge May Instruct A Jury To Draw No Inference From A Defendant's Decision Not To Testify: While the Supreme Court held in 1965 in Griffin that a judge could not imply that a defendant;s silence might imply guilt, it held in 1978 that a judge could instruct a jury that it could not make any inference from a defendant's decision not to testify.
Lakeside v. Oregon, 1978.
8. Defendant May Require A Judge To Instruct A Jury To Draw No Inference ZFrom The Defendant's Decision Not To Testify": The Supreme Court held that a trial judge must grant a defendant's request for a jury instruction that a jury must draw no inference from a defendat's decision not to testify.
Carter v. Kentucky, 1981.
9. Defense Counsel's Error In Requesting A Jury Instruction Does Not Waive A Defendant's Right To A Jury Instruction: The Supreme Court upheld a defendant's right to request a jury instruction that no inference could be drawn from the defendant's decision not to testify just because defense counsel had requested an oral "admonition" instead of a written "jury instruction."
James v. Kentucky, 1984.
10. A Guilty Plea Does Not Waive The Right To Silence At Sentencing Nor The Right Against An Inference Of Guilt: Amanda Mitchell pleaded guilty to major drug distribution charges, but asserted her right to reman silent at sentencing. This was significant because she faced mandatory minimum sentences of one year for conspiracy and ten years for distributing at least five kilograms of cocaine. It was also significant because the trial judge stated that he inferred Mitchell's guilt from her silence. The Supreme Court reversed her convictions both because a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of the right to remain silent at sentencing, and because making such an inference of guilt based on silence violated her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.
Mitchell v. United States, 1999.
2. At First, This Did Not Apply To State Prosecutions: In 1908, the Supreme Court declined to extend this promise to state prosecutions. Two men accused of fraud refused to take the witness stand. The jury was told of this refusal and convicted them. This precedent was reversed in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan, when the Supreme Court extended the protection to state prosecutions.
Twining v. New Jersey, 1908.
3. Prosecutors And Judges Cannot Mention Defendants' Silence Or Imply Guilt: Hudson was convicted of kidnapping raping, and murdering a woman. He declined to take the stand. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that neither prosecutors nor judges could mention to a jury a defendant's refusal to testify nor imply that this refusal could be construed to imply guilt.
Griffin v. California, 1965.
4. The Rights To Be Informed Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To An Attorney: The Supreme Court held that both incriminating and exculpatory statements by suspects in custody could not be admitted against defendants at trial unless the suspects were first advised of their rights against self-incrimination and their rights to an attorney before and during interrogation, unless a suspect waived those rights. The "Miranda" warning provides: "You have the right to remain silent. If you choose not to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you by the court. Do you understand? Will you agree to speak with us without an attorney?"
Miranda v. Arizona, 1966.
5. Defendants May Be Required To Describe Their Alibi Witnesses Before Trial: The Supreme Court upheld a Florida law which required defendants to describe the expected testimony of proposed alibi witnesses before trial so that prosecutors could seek rebuttal evidence. The Supreme Court held that this would not unreasonably curtail a defendant's right against self-incrimination because a prosecutor could already interrupt a trial to seek rebuttal evidence after an alibi witness testified.
Williams v. Florida, 1970.
6. The State Cannot Require A Defendant To Either Be The First Defense Witness Or To Thereafter Waive His Right To Testify: The Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee law which required a criminal defendat to either be the first defense witness or to waive the right to testify after other witnesses had offered defense evidence. This law would have deprived any defendant of the right to determine if they needed to testify later in a trial, and would have denied defendants of their right to a lawyer's guidance in structirong and presenting their defenses.
Brooks v. Tennessee, 1972.
7. A Judge May Instruct A Jury To Draw No Inference From A Defendant's Decision Not To Testify: While the Supreme Court held in 1965 in Griffin that a judge could not imply that a defendant;s silence might imply guilt, it held in 1978 that a judge could instruct a jury that it could not make any inference from a defendant's decision not to testify.
Lakeside v. Oregon, 1978.
8. Defendant May Require A Judge To Instruct A Jury To Draw No Inference ZFrom The Defendant's Decision Not To Testify": The Supreme Court held that a trial judge must grant a defendant's request for a jury instruction that a jury must draw no inference from a defendat's decision not to testify.
Carter v. Kentucky, 1981.
9. Defense Counsel's Error In Requesting A Jury Instruction Does Not Waive A Defendant's Right To A Jury Instruction: The Supreme Court upheld a defendant's right to request a jury instruction that no inference could be drawn from the defendant's decision not to testify just because defense counsel had requested an oral "admonition" instead of a written "jury instruction."
James v. Kentucky, 1984.
10. A Guilty Plea Does Not Waive The Right To Silence At Sentencing Nor The Right Against An Inference Of Guilt: Amanda Mitchell pleaded guilty to major drug distribution charges, but asserted her right to reman silent at sentencing. This was significant because she faced mandatory minimum sentences of one year for conspiracy and ten years for distributing at least five kilograms of cocaine. It was also significant because the trial judge stated that he inferred Mitchell's guilt from her silence. The Supreme Court reversed her convictions both because a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of the right to remain silent at sentencing, and because making such an inference of guilt based on silence violated her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.
Mitchell v. United States, 1999.
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