11. Your Right against Double Jeopardy. * *
What Is The Fifth Amendment's Promise To You Against "Double Jeopardy?"
In pertinent part, he Fifth Amendment makes this promise to every person: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
This promise includes four guarantees to you:
1. You cannot be tried a second time after you have been acquitted at a trial;
2. You cannot be tried a second time after you have been convicted at a trial;
3. You cannot be tried a second time after certain types of mistrials; and,
4. You cannot be punished further after you have been sentenced after a conviction.
There are three major exceptions to this promise against Double Jeopardy:
1. You can be tried separately by the federal government and a state government.
2. You can be tried separately by two or more state governments in certain circumstances; and,
3. You can be tried again if you moved for a mistrial, absent government misconduct.
The government is barred from trying you again if a mistrial is declared in three circumstances:
1. The jury has been sworn and seated in a jury trial, and a judge holds that the government has prevented you from getting a fair trial;
2. The first witness against you has been sworn in a trial by judge, and a judge holds that the government has prevented you from getting a fair trial; or,
3. You have pleaded guilty in a trial before a judge and you have been convicted and sentenced.
As we have seen with all the other promises in the Bill of Rights, the plain language against Double Jeopardy has been shaped by 227 years of court decisions. Here is a summary of those developments.
1. Hung Jury Does Not Trigger Double Jeopardy: The Supreme Court held that when a criminal trial results in a hung jury, the shield of Double Jeopardy does not apply and the defendant may be tried again by the same court on the same charge.
United States v. Perez, 1824.
2. Second Trial May Be Held On Different Counterfeited Bills: At his first trial, Randenbush was acquitted of counterfeiting a specific ten-dollar note. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not attach for a second trial where he was convicted of counterfeiting a separate note.
United States v. Randenbush, 1834.
3. Two Trials On State And Federal Charges Are Permissible: In the first case where the Supreme Court was asked whether the federal Bill of Rights applied to state criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court held that even though the Constitution gave Congress the right to criminalize counterfeiting, that did not preclude states from making the same decision. Double Jeopardy did not protect Fox in this case because he was tried twice by "separate sovereigns."
Fox v. Ohio, 1847.
4. "Separate Sovereigns" Also Applies To Federal And State Laws On Fugitive Slaves: As in Fox v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that states could pass laws to punish the same behavior as was defined by a federal criminal law.
Moore v. Illinois, 1852.
5. Possible Reversal Of Randenbush On Double Jeopardy: Nickerson had been acquitted of making a false statement when he applied for a subsidy for his cod-fishing ship. When he was tried again for making other false statements on the same application, the Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy barred a new trial for breaking the same law with the same general act,
United States v. Nickerson, 1854.
6. No Second Bite At The Apple: William Lange was convicted of stealing a mailbag. Congress had authorized a judge to sentence such a defendant to a fine or a one-year sentence. On the day after he was imprisoned, Lange paid the fine and claimed that this ended the court's authority to punish him. The trial judge tried t revoke and replace his original sentence, or to have a new charge filed against Lange. The Supreme Court released Lange because he had fulfilled his sentence.
Ex parte Lange, 1873.
7. A Decision That Would Probably Be Different Today: Bigelow was an officer of the Bank of the Republic. He faced fourteen counts for embezzlement. The jury was seated and sworn, and the prosecutor outlined his case. After a recess, the trial judge changed the indictment to cover just one of the charges. Bigelow argued that all charges should be dismissed because he had been placed in jeopardy when the jury was seated and sworn. The Supreme Court held that, until a verdict was issued, Double Jeopardy did not attach.
Ex parte Lange, 1873.
7. A Decision That Would Probably Be Different Today: Bigelow was an officer of the Bank of the Republic. He faced fourteen counts for embezzlement. The jury was seated and sworn, and the prosecutor outlined his case. After a recess, the trial judge changed the indictment to cover just one of the charges. Bigelow argued that all charges should be dismissed because he had been placed in jeopardy when the jury was seated and sworn. The Supreme Court held that, until a verdict was issued, Double Jeopardy did not attach.
Ex parte Bigelow, 1885.
8. Acquittal In A Criminal Trial Is a Bar To Government Prosecution In A Civil Case To Seize A Still And Moonshine: A Kentucky moonshiner was acquitted in a criminal trial for tax evasion. The Supreme Court held that this acquittal barred a subsequent civil suit by the government based on the same facts. This was reversed by 89 Firearms in 1984.
Coffey v. United States, 1886.
9. Acquittal Bars A Second Trial, But Conviction Does Not: Millard Ball was acquitted of murder while two co-defendants were convicted. After the convicted defendants appealed because of problems with the original indictment, all three men faced a second trial in which all three were convicted. The Supreme Court upheld Fillmore's Double Jeopardy appeal because he had been acquitted, but it allowed the second trial and conviction of the other two men.
Ball v. United States, 1896.
10. Different Conspirators Create Different Charges, Allowing A Second Trial: President Teddy Roosevelt has a political enemy, Sen. Joseph Burton (R-Kansas). Roosevelt prosecuted Burton twice for taking money from a company that Roosevelt was prosecuting for monopolization. The Supreme Court struck down Burton's first conviction because the charges were filed in the wrong state. The Supreme Court rejected Burton's Double Jeopardy appeal after his conviction in a second trial because the prosecutor proved to the jury that Burto had taken the money from a different briber.
Burton v. United States, 1906.
11. Read Your State's Constitution Before You Appeal: Brantley was acquitted for murder but convicted for the lesser charge of manslaughter. He moved for a new trial, and was convicted of murder, receiving a life sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that a twist in the Georgia Constitution waived Double Jeopardy protections where a defendant moves for a new trial on his own initiative, This holding was overruled in Price in 1970.
Brantley v. Georgia, 1910.
12, The Government Will Even Pursue You For $4: La Franca sold alcoholic beverages at his Louisiana restaurant for nine months during Prohibition. He was convicted in a criminal trial. The government then brought a civil action to collect taxes that La Franca had not paid. Because almost all of the unpaid taxes had been a subject in the criminal trial, the Supreme Court granted Double Jeopardy protection to La Franca on almost all of the tax claims. However, it allowed the government to seek a third trial to collect a $4 fee that had not been mentioned in the criminal trial.
United States v. La Franca, 1931.
13. You Can Be Convicted For Two Offenses Arising From The Same Act: Blockburger was convicted of two offenses arising from the same act: 1) selling morphine; and 2) selling morphine without a written order. The Supreme Court held that because the prosecutor proved different elements for each of the two crimes, Double Jeopardy would not block Blockburger's conviction on both counts.
Blockburger v. United States, 1932.
14. Double Jeopardy Did Not Apply To States in 1937, But It Did In 1969: Frank Palka (whose name was misspelled by the Supreme Court), killed two police officers while escaping from a burglary with a phonograph. At his first trial, Palka was acquitted of first-degree muder, but sentenced to life for second-degree murder. Under an obscure Connecticut law, Palka was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy clause did not apply to state prosecutions, and Palka was electrocuted in 1938. The Supreme Court later applied the Double Jeopardy clause to state prosecutions in Benton in 1969.
Palko v. Connecticut, 1937.
15. Acquittal Does Not Bar Penalties If Separate Proof Is Required: Charles Mitchell was a crooked banker. He was acquitted of bank fraud when he claimed a loss of value when he claimed a $2.8 million loss when he sold his stock to his wife and failed to report a devilish payment of $66,666.67 from the bank's management fund. Mitchell appealed when he was assessed a penalty for his unpaid taxes. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not apply because prosecutors had to prove different elements of the acts to justify the extra assessment.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 1938.
16. "Qui Tam" Civil Suits Are Not Barred By Double Jeopardy: A "qui tam" lawsuit is brought by a private citizen on behalf of the government against someone who allegedly owes money to the taxpayers. Here, contractors were convicted in a criminal trial of conspiring to rig bids for government construction projects. The Supreme Court held that, after such a conviction, Double Jeopardy did not bar citizens from seeking restitution from the contractors.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 1943.
17. A Failed Execution Attempt Does not Constitute Double Jeopardy: A jury convicted 16-year-old Willie Francis of fatally shooting a white man who may have had romantic links to the African-American boy. He was sentenced to be electrocuted. The drunken Chief Guard and electrician failed to connect the electric chair properly. The switch was thrown twice, forcing Francis into convulsions, but he was not killed. The Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision that a failed execution attempt did not trigger Double Jeopardy protections when the execution was carried out after a year of appeals.
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweberm 1947.
18. A Reversal of a Conviction Does Not Trigger Doule Jeopardy In 1950, But Did In 1978: Bryan was convicted of tax evasion. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because of a lack of evidence, but it only ordered a new trial instead of directing the trial court to issue an acquittal. The Supreme Court upheld this discretion for the Court of Appeals. This was overruled in Burks in 1978.
Bryan v. United States, 1950.
19. Double Jeopardy Is Triggered When A Defendant Seeks Only Acquittal In 1955, Not 1978: Sapir was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud. He appealed and sought a reversal and acquittal, but not an order for a new trial in the alternative. The Court of Appeals first ordered the case backto the trial court with an instruction to dismiss the indictment. The Court of Apeals later revoked its first order and directed the trial court to order a new trial. The Supreme Court upheld the first order, because Sapir had not asked for a new trial. This was overruled in Burks in 1978.
Sapir v. United States, 1955.
20. Fraud Conviction Does Not Bar Civil Recovery Of Unfair Profits: In 1947, Rex Trailer used the names of five veterans to gain priority in purchasing five surplus Jeeps. It was convicted of fraud in the case. The Supreme Court upheld a subsequent civil verdict to assess penalties for illegal profit-taking, holding that Double Jeopardy did not bar civil recovery where different facts were proved.
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 1956.
21. "Red Monday" Led To Acquittals of Communists: On a day when the Supreme Court issued three opinions striking down laws against Communist advocacy for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government, the Court ordered acquittals of five Communists who had only advocated such a violent overthrow and ordered new trials for nine defendants to determine whether they had crossed the line of "mere advocacy." This decision crippled the Smith Act, a federal law that had been used to prosecute many Communists. This decision was modified in Burks in 1978.
Yates v. United States, 1957.
22. Acquittal of First-Degree Murder Bars Second Trial On That Charge: Everett Green burned his girlfriend to death in an act of arson. He was acquitted of first-degree murder, but convictedof second-degree murder and imprisoned. Green won a new trial on appeal. At his second trial, Green was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court held that the first acquittal on that charge barred a second trial on that charge,
Green v. United States, 1957.
23. Separate Crimes From One Event Can Be Tried Separately: Hoag and his gang robbed five men outside a bar. Hoag was acquitted on charges of robbing three men at a trial where all five victims testified. Hoag was convicted at a second trial for the robbery of the other two men. The Spreme Court said that Double Jeopardy did not bar the second prosecution. This was modified in Ashe in 1970.
Hoag v. United States, 1958.
8. Acquittal In A Criminal Trial Is a Bar To Government Prosecution In A Civil Case To Seize A Still And Moonshine: A Kentucky moonshiner was acquitted in a criminal trial for tax evasion. The Supreme Court held that this acquittal barred a subsequent civil suit by the government based on the same facts. This was reversed by 89 Firearms in 1984.
Coffey v. United States, 1886.
9. Acquittal Bars A Second Trial, But Conviction Does Not: Millard Ball was acquitted of murder while two co-defendants were convicted. After the convicted defendants appealed because of problems with the original indictment, all three men faced a second trial in which all three were convicted. The Supreme Court upheld Fillmore's Double Jeopardy appeal because he had been acquitted, but it allowed the second trial and conviction of the other two men.
Ball v. United States, 1896.
10. Different Conspirators Create Different Charges, Allowing A Second Trial: President Teddy Roosevelt has a political enemy, Sen. Joseph Burton (R-Kansas). Roosevelt prosecuted Burton twice for taking money from a company that Roosevelt was prosecuting for monopolization. The Supreme Court struck down Burton's first conviction because the charges were filed in the wrong state. The Supreme Court rejected Burton's Double Jeopardy appeal after his conviction in a second trial because the prosecutor proved to the jury that Burto had taken the money from a different briber.
Burton v. United States, 1906.
11. Read Your State's Constitution Before You Appeal: Brantley was acquitted for murder but convicted for the lesser charge of manslaughter. He moved for a new trial, and was convicted of murder, receiving a life sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that a twist in the Georgia Constitution waived Double Jeopardy protections where a defendant moves for a new trial on his own initiative, This holding was overruled in Price in 1970.
Brantley v. Georgia, 1910.
12, The Government Will Even Pursue You For $4: La Franca sold alcoholic beverages at his Louisiana restaurant for nine months during Prohibition. He was convicted in a criminal trial. The government then brought a civil action to collect taxes that La Franca had not paid. Because almost all of the unpaid taxes had been a subject in the criminal trial, the Supreme Court granted Double Jeopardy protection to La Franca on almost all of the tax claims. However, it allowed the government to seek a third trial to collect a $4 fee that had not been mentioned in the criminal trial.
United States v. La Franca, 1931.
13. You Can Be Convicted For Two Offenses Arising From The Same Act: Blockburger was convicted of two offenses arising from the same act: 1) selling morphine; and 2) selling morphine without a written order. The Supreme Court held that because the prosecutor proved different elements for each of the two crimes, Double Jeopardy would not block Blockburger's conviction on both counts.
Blockburger v. United States, 1932.
14. Double Jeopardy Did Not Apply To States in 1937, But It Did In 1969: Frank Palka (whose name was misspelled by the Supreme Court), killed two police officers while escaping from a burglary with a phonograph. At his first trial, Palka was acquitted of first-degree muder, but sentenced to life for second-degree murder. Under an obscure Connecticut law, Palka was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy clause did not apply to state prosecutions, and Palka was electrocuted in 1938. The Supreme Court later applied the Double Jeopardy clause to state prosecutions in Benton in 1969.
Palko v. Connecticut, 1937.
15. Acquittal Does Not Bar Penalties If Separate Proof Is Required: Charles Mitchell was a crooked banker. He was acquitted of bank fraud when he claimed a loss of value when he claimed a $2.8 million loss when he sold his stock to his wife and failed to report a devilish payment of $66,666.67 from the bank's management fund. Mitchell appealed when he was assessed a penalty for his unpaid taxes. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not apply because prosecutors had to prove different elements of the acts to justify the extra assessment.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 1938.
16. "Qui Tam" Civil Suits Are Not Barred By Double Jeopardy: A "qui tam" lawsuit is brought by a private citizen on behalf of the government against someone who allegedly owes money to the taxpayers. Here, contractors were convicted in a criminal trial of conspiring to rig bids for government construction projects. The Supreme Court held that, after such a conviction, Double Jeopardy did not bar citizens from seeking restitution from the contractors.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 1943.
17. A Failed Execution Attempt Does not Constitute Double Jeopardy: A jury convicted 16-year-old Willie Francis of fatally shooting a white man who may have had romantic links to the African-American boy. He was sentenced to be electrocuted. The drunken Chief Guard and electrician failed to connect the electric chair properly. The switch was thrown twice, forcing Francis into convulsions, but he was not killed. The Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision that a failed execution attempt did not trigger Double Jeopardy protections when the execution was carried out after a year of appeals.
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweberm 1947.
18. A Reversal of a Conviction Does Not Trigger Doule Jeopardy In 1950, But Did In 1978: Bryan was convicted of tax evasion. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because of a lack of evidence, but it only ordered a new trial instead of directing the trial court to issue an acquittal. The Supreme Court upheld this discretion for the Court of Appeals. This was overruled in Burks in 1978.
Bryan v. United States, 1950.
19. Double Jeopardy Is Triggered When A Defendant Seeks Only Acquittal In 1955, Not 1978: Sapir was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud. He appealed and sought a reversal and acquittal, but not an order for a new trial in the alternative. The Court of Appeals first ordered the case backto the trial court with an instruction to dismiss the indictment. The Court of Apeals later revoked its first order and directed the trial court to order a new trial. The Supreme Court upheld the first order, because Sapir had not asked for a new trial. This was overruled in Burks in 1978.
Sapir v. United States, 1955.
20. Fraud Conviction Does Not Bar Civil Recovery Of Unfair Profits: In 1947, Rex Trailer used the names of five veterans to gain priority in purchasing five surplus Jeeps. It was convicted of fraud in the case. The Supreme Court upheld a subsequent civil verdict to assess penalties for illegal profit-taking, holding that Double Jeopardy did not bar civil recovery where different facts were proved.
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 1956.
21. "Red Monday" Led To Acquittals of Communists: On a day when the Supreme Court issued three opinions striking down laws against Communist advocacy for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government, the Court ordered acquittals of five Communists who had only advocated such a violent overthrow and ordered new trials for nine defendants to determine whether they had crossed the line of "mere advocacy." This decision crippled the Smith Act, a federal law that had been used to prosecute many Communists. This decision was modified in Burks in 1978.
Yates v. United States, 1957.
22. Acquittal of First-Degree Murder Bars Second Trial On That Charge: Everett Green burned his girlfriend to death in an act of arson. He was acquitted of first-degree murder, but convictedof second-degree murder and imprisoned. Green won a new trial on appeal. At his second trial, Green was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court held that the first acquittal on that charge barred a second trial on that charge,
Green v. United States, 1957.
23. Separate Crimes From One Event Can Be Tried Separately: Hoag and his gang robbed five men outside a bar. Hoag was acquitted on charges of robbing three men at a trial where all five victims testified. Hoag was convicted at a second trial for the robbery of the other two men. The Spreme Court said that Double Jeopardy did not bar the second prosecution. This was modified in Ashe in 1970.
Hoag v. United States, 1958.
24. "Separate Sovereigns" Is Strengthened: Bartkus robbed a federally-insured bank in Chicago. Federal and state prosecutors agreed that the federal trial would be held first. Bartkus was acquitted at the federal trial, but convicted on the state charge. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar prosecution of the same offense in different court systems. This strengthened the decisions from 1847 to 1860.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 1959.
25. Retrial Does Not Trigger Double Jeopardy Where Theory Was Continuing Conspiracy: Forman and his partner were owners of a pinball empire. They were charged with conspiracy to evade taxes by hiding income between 1942 and 1946. They were convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first ordered entry of acquittal, but then ordered a new trial, on the theory that the six-year statute of limitations expired in 1953, but a new trial could be asked to determine whether the conspiracy to hide the 1942-1945 income could have continued through 1952. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not apply under these facts. This was modified in Burks in 1978.
Forman v. United States, 1980.
26. Judicial Error At First Trial Bars A Second Trial: A corporation and two employees were charged with conspiracy. Midway through the trial, the district judge believed the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct, the witnesses were not credible, and the evidence was not sufficient. At that point, the trial judge ordered the jury to deliver a verdict of acquittal. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that the trial judge's action was premature, but it held that the acquittal was final and barred a second trial.
Fong Foo v. United States, 1962.
27. Reversal Of A Conviction On Collateral Grounds Does Not Bar A Second Trial: One district judge advised that if bank-robber Tateo did not plead guilty, he would be sentenced to life for kidnapping and receive additional consecutive sentences for other crimes if the jury convicted him. Tateo pled guilty. On appeal, a second district judge set aside the plea as involuntary. A third district judge ordered that there be no second trial. The Supreme Court held that a "collateral" reversal of a conviction did not trigger Double Jeopardy or bar a second trial.
United States v. Tateo, 1964.
26. Insane Predators Can Face Civil Commitment After Prison, With Due Process: The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a state from seeking civil commitment of a prisoner after completion of a prison sentence if he was found to be "insane" and represented a threat to society if due process protected the prisoner's rights.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 1966.
27. Require "Time Served" Credit Upon Retrial, and Justify Harsher Sentences: The Supreme Court held that when a convict receives a new trial and is again convicted, he must be goven credit for "time served" on the first conviction. This prevents a second punishment for the same crime. It also held that judges must justify any new sentence that is harsher than the original sentence.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 1969.
28. REVERSAL States Cannot Violate Double Jeopardy Protections: John Benton was acquitted of larceny but was sentenced to ten years for burglary. His conviction was set aside becausehis jurors had been forced to affirm a belief in God. On retrial, he was convicted of both charges and was concurrently sentenced to ten years for burglary and five years for larceny. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy now included state prosecutions, and that Benton's orginal acquittal for larceny barred a retrial on that charge. This reversed the Palko decision from 1937.
Benton v. Maryland, 1969,
29. No "Dual Sovereignty" For State And Local Charges: Joseph Waller led a protest in which a racially-insensitive mural was removed from city property. A municipal court convicted Waller for theft and sentenced him to 180 days on the county jail. A state court convicted him for the same acts and crime and sentenced him to five years in state prison. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy clause barred state and municipal charges and sentences for the same crime.
Waller v. Florida, 1970.
30. REVERSAL:State Cannot Hold A Second Trial For Other Victim In Same Robbery: The Supreme Court reversed its Hoag decision from 1958. Ashe and his gang robbed six players at a poker game in a residential basement in Missouri. Ashe was acquitted a robbing one victim. The state charged him with robbing a second player and won a conviction. The Supreme Court reversed Hoag and held that the state was barred from stringing prosecutions that arose from the same act after an initial acquittal was secured.
Ashe v. Swenson, 1970.
31. REVERSAL: Acquittal of Murder Bars A Sedond Trial On The Same Charge: A Georgia jury acquitted Price or murder, but convicted him of manslaughter. That first conviction was overturned because of a faulty jury instruction. A second jury again acquitted Price of murder, but concted him of manslaughter. The Supreme Court overturned the second verdict because Price should not have been charged again with murder. It remanded the case to the state to see if it could try Price for manslaughter without prejudice.
Price v. Georgia, 1970.
32. Conscientious Objector Not Shielded From Second Indictment By Preliminary Dismissal: A Peace Corps volunteer had refused draft induction and submitted all the necessary paperwork for a review of his application for exemption from combat duty. When he refused induction in 1971, he was indicted. The Disrict Court dismissed the indictment because Serfass persuaded the judge that it would be more efficient to await the result of his administrative appeal. When that appeal was rejected, Serfass was indicted again. The Supreme Court held that the first dismissal did not bar a second indictment because Serfass had never faced trial.
Serfass v. United States, 1973.
33. Courts Can Decide If A Trial Judge Can Properly Reverse A Conviction After Trial: Union leader George Wilson was convicted of stealing union funds. The trial judge dismissed the indictment because he ruled that the extensive delay between the alleged offense and the trial denied Wilson a fair trial. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge's holding was in effect an order for acquittal which barred a second trial for Wilson. The Supreme Court held that the government had the right to appeal the decisions of the two lower courts. If Wilson won such appeals, Double Jeopardy would bar a second trial. The Supreme Court returned the case to the lower courts to determine if the trial judges order was the equivalent of an order for acquittal.
Wilson v. United States, 1975.
34. Conscientious Objector Shield By Dismissal After Facts Were Heard At Trial: Jenkins was indicted for refusing induction. After hearing the evidence, the districy judge dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals held that this acted as an acquittal which barred a second indictment. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal could be perceived as an acquittal and dismissed the case. This was modified by Scott in 1978.
United States v. Jenkins, 1975.
35. Defense Counsel's Misconduct And Expulsion Do Not Trigger Double Jeopardy: Dinitz was charged with narcotics crimes. A jury was seated and sworn. During his opening statement, defense counsel repeatedly enraged the judge with improper statements and discussion of inadmissible evidence. Eventually, the trial judge dismissed defense counsel from the case, had him ejected from the courthouse, and offered Dinitz new counsel or a mistrial. Dinitz chose a mistrial, and then claimed that Double Jeopardy barred a second trial. The Supreme Court disagreed.
United States v. Dinitz, 1976.
36. When Defendant Demands New Trial As Part of Process For $20 Ticket: Ludwig was sined $20 for a reckless driving ticket. Under Massachusetts law, he was allowed to seek a new trial by a higher municipal court, which alsofined him $20. Ludwig claimed that the second trial, which was triggered on his own initiative, constituted a second prosecution which should be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 1976.
37. An Acquittal Order After a Hung Jury Is Dismissed Bars A Second Trial: Two corporations and an individual were charged with criminal contempt for allegedly conspiring to violate a consent agreement against monopolization. When the jury acquitted the individual and was deadlocked on the corporations, the trial judge dismissed the panel and issued an order of acquittal for the corporations. The Supreme Court upheld this order because it followed the details of federal rules in such situations. A second trial was barred.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 1977.
38. "A Joy Ride" And Auto Theft" Are The Same Thing For Double Jeopardy: Nathaniel Brown stole a car from a parking lot and kept it for nine days until he was apprehended. He pled guilty to "joyriding" and sentenced to 30 days. When he returned to Cleveland, he was charged again with "joyriding" and a count of "auto theft." The Supreme Court held that Brown's original sentencing precluded a second trial.
Brown v.Ohio, 1977.
39. Murder Conviction Bars Seccond Prosecution For A Lesser Included Offense: Harris was convicted of felony murder in connection with his conspirator's shooting of a convenience store clerk. He was later charged with the lesser included offense of "robbery with frearms." The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy barred the second prosecution because the robbery charge shouldhave been included in the original indictment because it arose from the same incident.
Harris v. Oklahoma, 1977.
40. If Defense Misconduct Triggers A Mistrial, Double Jeopardy Does Not Always Attach: In Washington's first trial, his murder conviction was reversed oon appeal. After the second jury was seated and sworn, defense counsel made such improper comments that the trial judge granted the government's request for a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy does not automatically attach because unethical defense counsel could work to secure Double Jeopardy with clear misconduct.
n
Arizona v. Washington, 1978.
41. Dismissal For Insufficient Evidence Is A Bar, But Trial Error Is Not: Burks was convicted of bank robbery. The Court of Appeals found that there was insufficient evidence to convict Burks because the government had not rebutted Burks' insanity defense. The Court pf Appeals directed the district court tp either order an acquittal or a new trial. The Supreme Court went much farther. If a court finds that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, Double Jeopardy bars a second trial. However, if a conviction is reversed for trial error, Double Jeopardy does not apply because a fair trial did not prove guilt.
Burks v. United States, 1978,
42. Double Jeopardy Attaches When A Jury Is Seated And Sworn: Bretz faced fraud charges k a Montana court. After a jury was seated and sworn, Bretz noted that there was a key typo in the indictment. The trial judge refused the prosecution's motion for leave to fix the typo. The prosecution took a mid-trial appeal yo the Montana Supreme Court, which declined to order the trial judge to allow a correction in the indictment. Nack at the trial court, the prosecution asked for the dismissal of the first indictment so that new charges could be brought. The Supreme Court held that in federal and state courts, Double Jeopardy protections began as soon as the jury was seated and sworn.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 1966.
27. Require "Time Served" Credit Upon Retrial, and Justify Harsher Sentences: The Supreme Court held that when a convict receives a new trial and is again convicted, he must be goven credit for "time served" on the first conviction. This prevents a second punishment for the same crime. It also held that judges must justify any new sentence that is harsher than the original sentence.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 1969.
28. REVERSAL States Cannot Violate Double Jeopardy Protections: John Benton was acquitted of larceny but was sentenced to ten years for burglary. His conviction was set aside becausehis jurors had been forced to affirm a belief in God. On retrial, he was convicted of both charges and was concurrently sentenced to ten years for burglary and five years for larceny. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy now included state prosecutions, and that Benton's orginal acquittal for larceny barred a retrial on that charge. This reversed the Palko decision from 1937.
Benton v. Maryland, 1969,
29. No "Dual Sovereignty" For State And Local Charges: Joseph Waller led a protest in which a racially-insensitive mural was removed from city property. A municipal court convicted Waller for theft and sentenced him to 180 days on the county jail. A state court convicted him for the same acts and crime and sentenced him to five years in state prison. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy clause barred state and municipal charges and sentences for the same crime.
Waller v. Florida, 1970.
30. REVERSAL:State Cannot Hold A Second Trial For Other Victim In Same Robbery: The Supreme Court reversed its Hoag decision from 1958. Ashe and his gang robbed six players at a poker game in a residential basement in Missouri. Ashe was acquitted a robbing one victim. The state charged him with robbing a second player and won a conviction. The Supreme Court reversed Hoag and held that the state was barred from stringing prosecutions that arose from the same act after an initial acquittal was secured.
Ashe v. Swenson, 1970.
31. REVERSAL: Acquittal of Murder Bars A Sedond Trial On The Same Charge: A Georgia jury acquitted Price or murder, but convicted him of manslaughter. That first conviction was overturned because of a faulty jury instruction. A second jury again acquitted Price of murder, but concted him of manslaughter. The Supreme Court overturned the second verdict because Price should not have been charged again with murder. It remanded the case to the state to see if it could try Price for manslaughter without prejudice.
Price v. Georgia, 1970.
32. Conscientious Objector Not Shielded From Second Indictment By Preliminary Dismissal: A Peace Corps volunteer had refused draft induction and submitted all the necessary paperwork for a review of his application for exemption from combat duty. When he refused induction in 1971, he was indicted. The Disrict Court dismissed the indictment because Serfass persuaded the judge that it would be more efficient to await the result of his administrative appeal. When that appeal was rejected, Serfass was indicted again. The Supreme Court held that the first dismissal did not bar a second indictment because Serfass had never faced trial.
Serfass v. United States, 1973.
33. Courts Can Decide If A Trial Judge Can Properly Reverse A Conviction After Trial: Union leader George Wilson was convicted of stealing union funds. The trial judge dismissed the indictment because he ruled that the extensive delay between the alleged offense and the trial denied Wilson a fair trial. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge's holding was in effect an order for acquittal which barred a second trial for Wilson. The Supreme Court held that the government had the right to appeal the decisions of the two lower courts. If Wilson won such appeals, Double Jeopardy would bar a second trial. The Supreme Court returned the case to the lower courts to determine if the trial judges order was the equivalent of an order for acquittal.
Wilson v. United States, 1975.
34. Conscientious Objector Shield By Dismissal After Facts Were Heard At Trial: Jenkins was indicted for refusing induction. After hearing the evidence, the districy judge dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals held that this acted as an acquittal which barred a second indictment. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal could be perceived as an acquittal and dismissed the case. This was modified by Scott in 1978.
United States v. Jenkins, 1975.
35. Defense Counsel's Misconduct And Expulsion Do Not Trigger Double Jeopardy: Dinitz was charged with narcotics crimes. A jury was seated and sworn. During his opening statement, defense counsel repeatedly enraged the judge with improper statements and discussion of inadmissible evidence. Eventually, the trial judge dismissed defense counsel from the case, had him ejected from the courthouse, and offered Dinitz new counsel or a mistrial. Dinitz chose a mistrial, and then claimed that Double Jeopardy barred a second trial. The Supreme Court disagreed.
United States v. Dinitz, 1976.
36. When Defendant Demands New Trial As Part of Process For $20 Ticket: Ludwig was sined $20 for a reckless driving ticket. Under Massachusetts law, he was allowed to seek a new trial by a higher municipal court, which alsofined him $20. Ludwig claimed that the second trial, which was triggered on his own initiative, constituted a second prosecution which should be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 1976.
37. An Acquittal Order After a Hung Jury Is Dismissed Bars A Second Trial: Two corporations and an individual were charged with criminal contempt for allegedly conspiring to violate a consent agreement against monopolization. When the jury acquitted the individual and was deadlocked on the corporations, the trial judge dismissed the panel and issued an order of acquittal for the corporations. The Supreme Court upheld this order because it followed the details of federal rules in such situations. A second trial was barred.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 1977.
38. "A Joy Ride" And Auto Theft" Are The Same Thing For Double Jeopardy: Nathaniel Brown stole a car from a parking lot and kept it for nine days until he was apprehended. He pled guilty to "joyriding" and sentenced to 30 days. When he returned to Cleveland, he was charged again with "joyriding" and a count of "auto theft." The Supreme Court held that Brown's original sentencing precluded a second trial.
Brown v.Ohio, 1977.
39. Murder Conviction Bars Seccond Prosecution For A Lesser Included Offense: Harris was convicted of felony murder in connection with his conspirator's shooting of a convenience store clerk. He was later charged with the lesser included offense of "robbery with frearms." The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy barred the second prosecution because the robbery charge shouldhave been included in the original indictment because it arose from the same incident.
Harris v. Oklahoma, 1977.
40. If Defense Misconduct Triggers A Mistrial, Double Jeopardy Does Not Always Attach: In Washington's first trial, his murder conviction was reversed oon appeal. After the second jury was seated and sworn, defense counsel made such improper comments that the trial judge granted the government's request for a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy does not automatically attach because unethical defense counsel could work to secure Double Jeopardy with clear misconduct.
n
Arizona v. Washington, 1978.
41. Dismissal For Insufficient Evidence Is A Bar, But Trial Error Is Not: Burks was convicted of bank robbery. The Court of Appeals found that there was insufficient evidence to convict Burks because the government had not rebutted Burks' insanity defense. The Court pf Appeals directed the district court tp either order an acquittal or a new trial. The Supreme Court went much farther. If a court finds that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, Double Jeopardy bars a second trial. However, if a conviction is reversed for trial error, Double Jeopardy does not apply because a fair trial did not prove guilt.
Burks v. United States, 1978,
42. Double Jeopardy Attaches When A Jury Is Seated And Sworn: Bretz faced fraud charges k a Montana court. After a jury was seated and sworn, Bretz noted that there was a key typo in the indictment. The trial judge refused the prosecution's motion for leave to fix the typo. The prosecution took a mid-trial appeal yo the Montana Supreme Court, which declined to order the trial judge to allow a correction in the indictment. Nack at the trial court, the prosecution asked for the dismissal of the first indictment so that new charges could be brought. The Supreme Court held that in federal and state courts, Double Jeopardy protections began as soon as the jury was seated and sworn.
Crist v. Bretz, 1978.
43. Acquittal On One Aspect Of a Single Count Is A Bar To A Second Trial: Federal laws on gambling rings punish rings of more than five people from facilitating gambling that is illegal in the home state. Sanabria and others were indicted on a single count of running a numbers game and a horse-betting gring in Minnesota. Sanabria pointed out that numbers games are legal in Massachusetts and that the government had produced no evidence tying him to horse betting. The trial judge acquitted Sanabria because there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The Supreme Court held that when a trial involves a single count, the acquittal on the numbers game and the finding of insufficient evidence on horse betting triggered Double Jeopardy protections for Sanabria.
Sanabria v. United States, 1978.
44. REVERSAL: Double Jeopardy Does Not Apply If Defendant Earns Dismissal Before A Judge Or Jury Determines Guilt Because Of A Procedural Error: A Michigan police officer was indicted for three counts of distributing narcotics. Before the end of the trial, Scott persuaded the trial court to dismiss two counts because his right to a fair trial had been prejudiced by delays before the imdictment was filed. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy was not triggered where the defendant secured dismissal of counts on a procedural ground that did not deal with his guilt or innocence before the judge or jury has determined his guilt.
United States v. Scott, 1978.
45. Double Jeopardy Bars Two Sentences For Two Crimes Arising From The Same Facts, Circumstances, and Crime: Whalen was convicted of "first-degree murder while committing a rape" and was sentenced to a term of 20 years to life. After the same trial, Whalen was convicted of committing the same rape and sentenced to a second consecutive sentence. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy barred the imposition of the second sentence fore the lesser included offense of rape because Whalen could not be convicted of "murder while committing a rape" unless the evidence showed that Whalen had also committed the rape. "Multiple punishments cannot be imposed for two offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction unless each offense 'requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' A conviction for 'killing in the course of a rape' cannot be had without proving all the elements of the offense of 'rape.'" This was modified by Hunter in 1983.
Whalen v. United States, 1980.
46. No Double Jeopardy Where Defendant Wins A Mistrial, But The Defendant Was Not Tricked Into Moving For A Mistrial By Prosecutorial Or Judicial Misconduct: Kennedy was on trial for stealing and trying to sell an oriental rug. The prosecution called a rug expert to testify on the value and identity of the rug. Defense counsel got the expert to admit that he had filed a criminal complaint against Kennedy during an earlier transaction, but no charges were filed in that case. On cross examination, the prosecutor asked if the expert had ever bought a rug from Kennedy. When the expert said that he had never concluded a second deal with Kennedy, the prosecutor asked, "Is that because he is a crook?" Kennedy sought and received a mistrial. At a second trial, Kennedy sought to dismiss the charge based on Double Jeopardy. The trial judge found that the prosecutor had not committed misconduct to trigger a mistrial and continued the second trial. The Oregon Supreme Court also found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct, but reversed the conviction on Double Jeopardy grounds.
The U.S. Supreme reversed the appellate decision, reinstated the conviction, and held: "Where a defendant in a criminal trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he may invoke the bar of Double Jeopardy in a second effort to try him only if the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was prosecutorial or judicial conduct intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial." Because te lower trial and appellate courts found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct, the conviction was upheld.
Oregon v. Kennedy, 1982.
47. A Reversal Of Conviction Based On Insufficient Evidence Triggers Double Jeopardy, But An Appellate Reversal Based On The Weight Of The Evidence Does Not: Tibbs was convicted of rape and murder. The Florida Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. But, "acting as a thirteenth juror that substituted its judgement for that of the jury, the appellate court reversed the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy would apply if there had been insufficient evidence for a fair jury to convict, Double Jeopardy would not apply where the appellate court only disagreed with the jury's decision that the prosecution's case had provided enough evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court compared this situation to a "hung jury" which did not bar a second trial.
Tibbs v. Florida, 1982.
48. MODIFIED: Double Jeopardy Does Not Bar A Second Consecutive Sentence Where The Legislature Defines A Separate Crime And Authorizes A Consecutive Sentence: Hunter robbed a supermarket with a revolver. One Missouri law prohibited "felony armed robbery." A second Missouri authorized a consecutive sentence for "armed criminal action" for committing a violent felony while armed with a deadly weapon. The U.S. Supreme Court held that where a state legislature had authorized a second consecutive sentence for "armed criminal action," Double Jeopardy did not apply. In the earlier Whalen case in 1980, the case was federal, and Congress had not provided for consecutive sentences for "rape" and "killing during a rape."
Missouri v. Hunter, 1983.
49. MODIFIED: Criminal Acquittal No Longer Bars Subsequent Civil Forfeiture Action Under Double Jeopardy: Patrick Mulcahey was acquitted of intentionally selling firearms without a federal license. The BATF then seized his 89 guns and sought a civil forfeiture judgement. The Supreme Court held that the criminal acquittal only showed that Mulcahey was not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but the civil standard of "preponderance of the evidence" was easier to meet and that seizing contraband was not the equivalent of being put twice in risk of life or limb. In allowing the seizure of the guns, the Supreme Court reversed the Coffey case from 1886 where it had held that Double Jeopardy barred revenuers from seizing a still and moonshine after Coffey had been tried and acquitted.
United States v. One Assortment Of 89 Firearms, 1984.
50. A Two-Tier State Trial System Involving A Conviction Does Not Trigger A Double Jeopardy Claim: Lydon was charged with possession of a "jimmy," a tool to unlock a vehicle through a window. Under Massachusetts law, Lydon was allowed to plead his case on the minor charge before a judge. If the judge finds the petty criminal guilty, the criminal is allowed to seek a new trial before a jury or a judge on a higher bench. The first judge found Lydon guilty. Lydon exercised his right to a new trial, but then claimed that Double Jeopardy barred further proceedings because the first judge may not have had sufficient evidence to sustain his first conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the Double Jeopardy because Lydon had been convicted and no appellate court had reversed his conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence.
Justices Of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 1984.
51. Double Jeopardy Is No Bar In Continuing Criminal Enterprises: Garrett was a drug lord. In 1981, he was convicted of federal charges for importing two shiploads of drugs in Washington State, and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine. Other charges for other offenses were not charged, so that he could be charged again. But two months later, he faced federal charges in Florida for further drug smuggling charges and for operating a continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE"). To prove the three prior crimes needed to sustain the CCE charge, the government offered evidence of other crimes in both Washington State and Florida. Garrett was convicted of the smuggling and CCE charges and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment and a $100,000 fine, with the Washington and Florida sentences to run consecutively. The Supreme Court held that the CCE crime was not the same as the three predicate offenses, and that Congress intended to allow consecutive sentences for predicate crimes and the CCE conviction.
Garrett v. United States, 1985.
52. Two States Can Try A Defendant For The Same Crime If It Is Committed In Both States: Heath conspired in Alabama with two hit-men to kidnap and murder his wife. They kidnapped her in Alabama and murdered her nearby in Georgia. To avoid the death penalty, Heath agreed to plead guilty and accept a life sentence in Georgia. Health was later charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in Alabama.
The Supreme Court denied Heath's Double Jeopardy claim. "It has been uniformy held that the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each State's power to prosecute derives from its inherent sovereignty, preserved to it by the Tenth Amendment, and not from the Federal Government. Given the distinct sources of their powers to try a defendant, the States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal Government."
Heath v. Alabama, 1985.
53. Convict Must Show Double Jeopardy Violation To Earn Bar On Conviction: James Mathews and Stephen Daugherty robbed an Ohio bank and fled in a car. Police surrounded their hideout, heard a shot. and accepted Mathews' surrender. They found Daugherty dead in the house, and Mathews claimed that Daugherty had committed suicide. Mathews was charged with aggravated robbery, and he pleaded guilty. A few days later, he confessed to killing Daugherty. A new indictment was amended to include aggravated murder (bank robbery) and the lesser included offense of murder. The Ohio intermediate court struck down the felony murder conviction which was based on Double Jeopardy based evidence of the bank robbery, but upheld the murder conviction based on Mathews' confession and other evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to consider the case.
On federal appeals for habeas corpus relief, the federal district court denied Mathews' appeal. But the Court of Appeals granted Mathews' request for habeas corpus relief and ruled to grant him a new trial on the plain murder charge.
The Supreme Court held that the federal Court of Appeals lacked grounds to grant habeas corpus review and remanded the case for action to uphold the intermediate Ohio court's holding to sustain the plain murder charge. The confession and other evidence of plain murder sufficed to sustain that charge, which was not barred by Double Jeopardy.
Morris v. Mathews, 1986.
54. MODIFIED: Post-Conviction Civil Penalties Can Be Too Excessive In Individual Cases: Halper was convicted of submitting 65 false claims for Medicare patients. He was sentenced to prison and fined $5,000. The government then sought civil claims against Halper for the $2,000 per false claims authorized by Congress in the civil False Claims Act. The Supreme Court held that the $130,000 fine was so out of line with the government's estimated cost of $585 that it held that the fine should be barred by Double Jeopardy and reduced to a fairer estimate of the government's actual cost. This modified the Supreme Court's earlier recognitions of post-conviction civil penalties in cases such as Helvering in 1938 and Rex Trailer in 1956. However, the Supreme Court held that this ruling was closely constrained to the facts of this case. This ruling was later overruled by Hudson in 1997.
United States v. Halper, 1989.
55. This Is One Of "Those" Cases: Corbin was driving drunk, speeding, going the wrong way on a highway, and driving too fast for the conditions in a terrible storm when he hit two cars. While EMTs were taking the other two drivers to the hospital, police gave Corbin tickets for DWI and driving on the wrong side of the median. Corbin promptly pleaded guilty to the two tickets. The judge, being unaware that one driver had been maimed and the other had died, imposed the appropriate fines, which Corbin paid. He successfully persuaded the Supreme Court that his punishment had been adjudged, levied and collected, and that his Double Jeopardy rights overrode the sense of justice and the charges for vehicular homicide which local prosecutors belatedly filed. This decision was overruled by Dixon in 1993.
The Corbin decision caused much confusion and consternation for two reasons. It offended a sense of justice. Equally important it vastly expanded the test from Blockburger in 1932, where Double Jeopardy was not triggered for "sale of morphine" and "sale of morphine without a license" because prosecutors had to prove different elements for each offense. Corbin briefly added a requirement that prosecutors cannot bring a second charge if it requires proof of an element that was "proven" in the first prosecution (DWI, speeding, reckless behavior). This second test was dropped in Dixon.
Grady v. Corbin, 1990.
56. Separate Crimes, In Separate States, At Different Times, Do Not Trigger Double Jeopardy: DEA agents shut down an Oklahoma meth lab run by Frank Felix in early 1987. The agents followed him to Missouri that spring, where an informant sold Felix the equipment and chemicals for a new lab. Felix was charged, tried, and convicted in Missouri, in part on the basis of evidence of intent based on his Oklahoma operation, which was not part of the Missouri charges. In 1989, he was convicted of meth operations he had run in Oklahoma. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions in both states, holding that separate charges, separate evidences, in separate states, at separate times, did not trigger Double Jeopardy protections.
United States v. Felix, 1992.
57. REVERSAL: Drug Dealer Walks, Wife-Beater Faces Extra Punishment: Dixon was a cocaine dealer who was convicted of criminal contempt of an order to commit no further crimes as part of a sentence for an earlier crime. Under Corbin, his contempt charges were dismissed because they were based on earlier charges for which he had already been convicted.
Wife-beater Foster faced five counts related to contempt for violating a Civil Protective Order ("CPO") to not threaten his wife further. Count I (simple assault of his wife) was dismissed because the incident was included in the preliminary CPO. However, separate elements needed to be proven for the new Counts II-IV (three threats to injure another on three different occasions) and Count V (assault with intent to kill his wife).
This decision reversed the Corbin decision from 1990. This decision preserved the Blockburger requirement from 1932, which required prosecutors to prove different elements for two crimes and charges. Here, the Supreme Court dropped the added Corbin requirement that prosecutors were barred from bringing subsequent charges where they had to prove elements that had already been proven in the first set of charges.
United States v. Dixon, 1993.
52. Two States Can Try A Defendant For The Same Crime If It Is Committed In Both States: Heath conspired in Alabama with two hit-men to kidnap and murder his wife. They kidnapped her in Alabama and murdered her nearby in Georgia. To avoid the death penalty, Heath agreed to plead guilty and accept a life sentence in Georgia. Health was later charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in Alabama.
The Supreme Court denied Heath's Double Jeopardy claim. "It has been uniformy held that the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each State's power to prosecute derives from its inherent sovereignty, preserved to it by the Tenth Amendment, and not from the Federal Government. Given the distinct sources of their powers to try a defendant, the States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal Government."
Heath v. Alabama, 1985.
53. Convict Must Show Double Jeopardy Violation To Earn Bar On Conviction: James Mathews and Stephen Daugherty robbed an Ohio bank and fled in a car. Police surrounded their hideout, heard a shot. and accepted Mathews' surrender. They found Daugherty dead in the house, and Mathews claimed that Daugherty had committed suicide. Mathews was charged with aggravated robbery, and he pleaded guilty. A few days later, he confessed to killing Daugherty. A new indictment was amended to include aggravated murder (bank robbery) and the lesser included offense of murder. The Ohio intermediate court struck down the felony murder conviction which was based on Double Jeopardy based evidence of the bank robbery, but upheld the murder conviction based on Mathews' confession and other evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to consider the case.
On federal appeals for habeas corpus relief, the federal district court denied Mathews' appeal. But the Court of Appeals granted Mathews' request for habeas corpus relief and ruled to grant him a new trial on the plain murder charge.
The Supreme Court held that the federal Court of Appeals lacked grounds to grant habeas corpus review and remanded the case for action to uphold the intermediate Ohio court's holding to sustain the plain murder charge. The confession and other evidence of plain murder sufficed to sustain that charge, which was not barred by Double Jeopardy.
Morris v. Mathews, 1986.
54. MODIFIED: Post-Conviction Civil Penalties Can Be Too Excessive In Individual Cases: Halper was convicted of submitting 65 false claims for Medicare patients. He was sentenced to prison and fined $5,000. The government then sought civil claims against Halper for the $2,000 per false claims authorized by Congress in the civil False Claims Act. The Supreme Court held that the $130,000 fine was so out of line with the government's estimated cost of $585 that it held that the fine should be barred by Double Jeopardy and reduced to a fairer estimate of the government's actual cost. This modified the Supreme Court's earlier recognitions of post-conviction civil penalties in cases such as Helvering in 1938 and Rex Trailer in 1956. However, the Supreme Court held that this ruling was closely constrained to the facts of this case. This ruling was later overruled by Hudson in 1997.
United States v. Halper, 1989.
55. This Is One Of "Those" Cases: Corbin was driving drunk, speeding, going the wrong way on a highway, and driving too fast for the conditions in a terrible storm when he hit two cars. While EMTs were taking the other two drivers to the hospital, police gave Corbin tickets for DWI and driving on the wrong side of the median. Corbin promptly pleaded guilty to the two tickets. The judge, being unaware that one driver had been maimed and the other had died, imposed the appropriate fines, which Corbin paid. He successfully persuaded the Supreme Court that his punishment had been adjudged, levied and collected, and that his Double Jeopardy rights overrode the sense of justice and the charges for vehicular homicide which local prosecutors belatedly filed. This decision was overruled by Dixon in 1993.
The Corbin decision caused much confusion and consternation for two reasons. It offended a sense of justice. Equally important it vastly expanded the test from Blockburger in 1932, where Double Jeopardy was not triggered for "sale of morphine" and "sale of morphine without a license" because prosecutors had to prove different elements for each offense. Corbin briefly added a requirement that prosecutors cannot bring a second charge if it requires proof of an element that was "proven" in the first prosecution (DWI, speeding, reckless behavior). This second test was dropped in Dixon.
Grady v. Corbin, 1990.
56. Separate Crimes, In Separate States, At Different Times, Do Not Trigger Double Jeopardy: DEA agents shut down an Oklahoma meth lab run by Frank Felix in early 1987. The agents followed him to Missouri that spring, where an informant sold Felix the equipment and chemicals for a new lab. Felix was charged, tried, and convicted in Missouri, in part on the basis of evidence of intent based on his Oklahoma operation, which was not part of the Missouri charges. In 1989, he was convicted of meth operations he had run in Oklahoma. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions in both states, holding that separate charges, separate evidences, in separate states, at separate times, did not trigger Double Jeopardy protections.
United States v. Felix, 1992.
57. REVERSAL: Drug Dealer Walks, Wife-Beater Faces Extra Punishment: Dixon was a cocaine dealer who was convicted of criminal contempt of an order to commit no further crimes as part of a sentence for an earlier crime. Under Corbin, his contempt charges were dismissed because they were based on earlier charges for which he had already been convicted.
Wife-beater Foster faced five counts related to contempt for violating a Civil Protective Order ("CPO") to not threaten his wife further. Count I (simple assault of his wife) was dismissed because the incident was included in the preliminary CPO. However, separate elements needed to be proven for the new Counts II-IV (three threats to injure another on three different occasions) and Count V (assault with intent to kill his wife).
This decision reversed the Corbin decision from 1990. This decision preserved the Blockburger requirement from 1932, which required prosecutors to prove different elements for two crimes and charges. Here, the Supreme Court dropped the added Corbin requirement that prosecutors were barred from bringing subsequent charges where they had to prove elements that had already been proven in the first set of charges.
United States v. Dixon, 1993.
58. MODIFIED: A Subsequent Civil Fine Can Be Punitive And May Be Barred: The Supreme Court further clarified its 1989 decision in Halper which had barred further civil fines after a conviction for Medicare fraud. Here, the Kurth family pled guilty for running a marijuana plantation in Montana. The Supreme Court barred a subsequent prosecution, conviction, and fine for civil tax evasion for not paying a tax to produce and possess marijuana. The Supreme Court held that merely calling a further penalty a tax did not shield its real identity as a subsequent criminal penalty.
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 1994.
59. No Concurrent Life Sentences For The Same Crime: Drug kingpin Tommy Rutledge was convicted and given concurrent life sentences both for conspiring to distribute narcotics and for operating a continuing criminal enterprise to distribute those narcotics. The unanimous Supreme Court held that this would punish Rutledge twice for the same facts which constituted both crimes.
Rutledge v. United States, 1996.
60. Civil Penalties Do Not Bar Subsequent Criminal Charges: John Hammond was a bank president who engaged in questionable loans. The civil Office of the Comptroller of the Currency fined Hudson and barred him from future banking activities. When subsequent criminal charges were filed against him, Hudson claimed that the criminal prosecution was barred by Double Jeopardy. The unanimous Supreme Court held that the OCC action was not a criminal prosecution by a civil agency, and allowed the criminal prosecution to continue.
Hudson v. United States, 1997.
61. "Separate Sovereign" Immunity From Double Jeopardy Protections Also Applies To Tribal And Federal Prosecutions: Billy Joe Lara was not a tribal member and he was arrested for public intoxication and assaulting an officer on a reservation. He was convicted by a tribal court for the assault. He was subsequently charged in federal court for assaulting a federal officer. The Supreme Court held that Congress had properly recognized the sovereignty of tribal courts to charge non-members for crimes committed on reservations, holding that a defendant could be tried for the same offense by tribal and federal authorities.
United States v. Lara, 2004.
62. A Mid-Trial Acquittal On a Separate Gun Charge Will Bar Further Proceedings On That ZCharge. Unless The State Provides For The Resuscitation Of That Charge After An Appeal: Melvin Smith faced several charges, including a charge of illegal gun possession. Mid-trial the judge declared that the state had failed to provide adequate evidence of gun possession, and order Smith acquittal on that charge. In a mid-trial appeal, the State Supreme Court held that the state had provided aqequate evidence to sustain the charge. Upon resumption of the trial, the trial judge submitted the gun charge to the jury, which convicted Smith. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did apply here, where an acquittal on the gun charge had been entered. The Supreme Court noted that in prior cases, it had held that Double Jeopardy did not apply where states provided procedures for reversing dismissal of charges that were later overturned by appeals to precedent, but held that Massachusetts law did not provide for such curative procedures.
Smith v. Massachusetts, 2005.
63. Acquittal On The Core Charges Bars Re-Trial On Lesser Included Offenses Which Ended In A Hung Jury: F/ Scott Yeager was a key player in the Enron fraud scandals. He was acquitted on the main charges of security fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to engage in insider trading and money laundering, but the jury was undecided on 20 lesser charges of insider trading and 99 lesser counts of money laundering. The Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy barred retrial on the lesser offenses where sommon sense showed that they jury had decided that insider trading and money laundering had not occurred when it acquitted Yeager of the conspiracy charge.
Yeager v. United States, 2009.
64. A Reasonable Dec;aration Of A Mistrial Does Not Bar A Re-Trial Where There Is Not Prosecutorial Or Judicial Misconduct: During Reginald Lett's murder trial, the judge abruptly declared a mistrial on the second day of jury deliberations when a juror merely asked the judge what would happen if the jury could not agree. Upon retrial, Lett was convicted. The conviction was sustained by state appellate courts. Upon a federal appeal, the Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a second trial where a mistrial was not caused by prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, but was caused by a hasty judicial decision.
Renico v. Lett, 2010.
65. A Foreman's Statement Is Not An Acquittal: A jury forewoman informed a judge that, after only four hours, the jury had unanimously voted to acquit Blueford of capital murder and first-degree murder but was hopelessly deadlocked on a manslaughter charge. The judge ordered the jury to continue its deliberations, but later ordered a mistrial on all charges. The state later re-charged Blueford with all three charges. A divided Supreme Court held that Double Jeopardy did not prevent re-trials on the capital murder and first-degree murder charges because a blanket mistrial had been ordered without received acquittal reports from the jury on those charges.
Blueford v. Arkansas No. 10-1320, 2012.
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